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A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration 
Sanford  J. Grossman 
Princeton University 
Oliver  D. Hart 
Massachusetts  Institute of Technology 
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes  that contractual rights can 
be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to 
list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to 
let one  party purchase  all residual rights. Ownership  is the purchase 
of these  residual  rights.  When  residual  rights are purchased  by one 
party,  they  are  lost  by  a  second  party,  and  this  inevitably  creates 
distortions.  Firm  1 purchases  firm 2 when  firm l's control  increases 
the  productivity  of  its  management  more  than  the  loss of  control 
decreases  the  productivity  of  firm 2's management. 
I.  Introduction 
A.  General  Introduction 
What  is a firm?  What  are  the  determinants  of  how  vertically  or  later- 
ally  integrated  the  activities  of  the  firm  are?  This  paper  builds  on  the 
foundations  laid  by  Coase  (1937),  Klein,  Crawford,  and  Alchian 
(1978),  and  Williamson  (1979),  which  emphasize  the  benefits  of  "con- 
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trol" in response  to situations in which there are difficulties  in writing 
or enforcing  complete  contracts (see also Williamson  1971,  1983; Wil- 
liamson,  Wachter,  and Harris  1975; Teece  1980). We define  the firm 
as being  composed  of  the  assets  (e.g.,  machines,  inventories)  that it 
owns.  We  present  a theory  of  costly  contracts  that  emphasizes  that 
contractual  rights  can  be  of  two  types:  specific  rights  and  residual 
rights. When  it is too costly for one  party to specify  a long  list of the 
particular  rights  it desires  over  another  party's assets, it may be op- 
timal for that party to purchase  all the rights except  those specifically 
mentioned  in the contract. Ownership  is the purchase  of these resid- 
ual rights of control.  We show that there can be harmful  effects  asso- 
ciated  with  the  wrong  allocation  of  residual  rights.  In  particular,  a 
firm that purchases  its supplier,  thereby  removing  residual  rights of 
control  from  the manager  of the supplying  company,  can distort the 
manager's  incentives  sufficiently  to make common  ownership  harm- 
ful. We develop  a theory  of integration  based on the attempt of par- 
ties in writing  a contract  to allocate  efficiently  the  residual  rights  of 
control  between  themselves. 
We begin by reviewing some transactions cost-based  arguments  for 
integration.  Coase  (1937)  suggested  that  transactions  will  be  orga- 
nized in the firm when  the cost of doing  this is lower than the cost of 
using  the market.  He  added  some  content  to this idea by proposing 
that the costs of constant  recontracting  with an outside  firm or man- 
ager can be high relative to those of signing a long-term  contract with 
an employee  in which the employee  agrees to carry out the commands 
of  the  employer.  Klein  et  al.  (1978)  and  Williamson  (1979)  added 
further  content  by arguing  that a contractual  relationship  between  a 
separately  owned  buyer  and  seller  will be  plagued  by opportunistic 
and inefficient  behavior in situations in which there are large amounts 
of surplus to be divided  ex post and in which, because of the impossi- 
bility of writing a complete,  contingent  contract, the ex ante contract 
does not specify a clear division of this surplus. Such situations in turn 
are likely to arise when  either  the buyer  or seller must  make invest- 
ments that have a smaller value in a use outside  their own relationship 
than within the  relationship  (i.e.,  there  exist  "asset specificities"). 
While these  statements  help  us understand  when  the costs of con- 
tracting  between  separately  owned  firms  may be  high,  they  do  not 
elucidate  what the benefits  are of  "organizing  the  transaction  within 
the  firm." In  particular,  given  that it is difficult  to write a complete 
contract between  a buyer and seller and this creates room for oppor- 
tunistic behavior,  the transactions  cost-based  arguments  for integra- 
tion  do  not  explain  how  the  scope  for  such behavior  changes  when 
one  of  the  self-interested  owners  becomes  an equally  self-interested 
employee  of  the  other  owner.  Furthermore,  if  vertical  integration VERTICAL  AND  LATERAL  INTEGRATION  693 
always reduces  transaction  costs, any buyer A and seller B that have a 
contractual relationship  should  be able to make themselves  better off 
as follows:  (i) A buys B and makes the previous  owner  of B the man- 
ager  of  a  new  subsidiary;  (ii) A  sets  a  transfer  price  between  the 
subsidiary and itself equal to the contract price that existed  when  the 
firms were  separate  enterprises;  and  (iii) A gives the manager  of B a 
compensation  package  equal  to  the  profit  of  the  subsidiary.  Given 
this, however,  how can integration  ever be strictly worse than nonin- 
tegration;  that is, what limits the size of the firm?' 
A second  question  raised by the transactions cost-based  arguments 
concerns  the definition  of integration  itself. In particular, what does it 
mean for one  firm to be more integrated  than another? For example, 
is a firm that calls its retail force  "employees" more  integrated  than 
one that calls its retail force "independent  but exclusive  sales agents"? 
Existing theories  cannot answer these questions because they do not 
give  a  sufficiently  clear  definition  of  integration  for  its  costs  and 
benefits  to be assessed.  It is not clear whether  these  theories  are de- 
signed  to explain  the types of people  called employees  or instead the 
types of assets under  the control of a single ownership  unit. We define 
integration  in terms of the ownership  of assets and develop  a model to 
explain  when  one  firm  will  desire  to  acquire  the  assets  of  another 
firm. We will argue  that, if one  party gets rights of control,  then  this 
diminishes  the rights of the other party to have control. To the extent 
that there  are benefits  of control,  there  will always be potential  costs 
associated  with  removing  control  (i.e.,  ownership)  from  those  who 
manage  productive  activities. 
B.  What Is Integration? 
We define  a firm to consist of those assets that it owns or over which it 
has  control;  we  do  not  distinguish  between  ownership  and  control 
1 See  Evans and  Grossman  (1983)  for an elaboration  of  the critique of  the transac- 
tions cost-based  arguments  for integration.  Coase (1937) states that the size of the firm 
is limited by the managerial  capacity of the single owner to manage  many activities. As 
noted  in  the  text,  this  is  unconvincing  since  the  owner  could  always  hire  another 
manager.  The  other authors do not give any clear statement  as to what limits the size of 
the firm but appear to accept Coase's view that integration  transforms a hostile supplier 
into  a docile  employee;  thus  the  contracting  problems  associated  with  independent 
ownership  are  greatly  diminished.  However,  there  are  some  references  to increased 
bureaucracy  and  its associated  cost.  See  Williamson  (1967),  Rosen  (1982),  Keren  and 
Levhari (1983),  and Waldman (1984)  for specific models  of how the number of people 
involved  in  production  affects  the  overall  cost  of  production.  None  of  these  papers 
makes any distinction  between  the  activities carried out via contract between  separate 
owners and the activities carried out in a single ownership  unit. That is, the theories are 
equally  valid descriptions  of  how  a firm can use  hierarchies  of  outside  contractors  as 
they are theories  of  employment  within  the firm. 694  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
and virtually define  ownership  as the power  to exercise  control.  In a 
corporation  the  shareholders  as a group  have  control  and  delegate 
this control  to the board  of  directors  (i.e.,  management).  Of course, 
control or ownership  is never absolute.  For example,  a firm that owns 
a machine  may  not  be  able  to  sell it without  the  permission  of  the 
lenders  for which the  machine  serves as collateral; more  generally,  a 
firm may give another  firm specific authority over its machines.  How- 
ever, ownership  gives the owner  all rights to use the machine  that he 
has not voluntarily  given  away or that the government  or some other 
party  has  not  taken  by  force.  We  believe  that  this  terminology  is 
roughly  consistent  with standard  usage.2 
In our  attempt  to explain  asset ownership,  we do  not  distinguish 
between  employees  and  outside  contractors  in the case in which  the 
firm provides all the tools and other assets used by the contractor. For 
example,  in insurance  retailing  a firm may use its own employees  as 
commissioned  agents  or use independent  agents.  The  important  dif- 
ference  between  the two forms of retailing is that the employee-agent 
does  not own the list of his clients, while the independent  agent does 
own  the  list.  If  the  firm  owned  the  list and  all the  other  important 
assets of the independent  agents,  then we would  say that such a com- 
pany had the  same degree  of  integration  as a company  in which the 
retail sales force was composed  of "employees." (A detailed discussion 
of  the  insurance  industry  may be found  in Sec. IV.)  As another  ex- 
ample,  consider  vertical  integration  in  shoe  manufacturing.  In  the 
eighteenth  century  much  of  the  manufacturing  of  shoes  switched 
from the "putting out" system, in which the worker sewed the upper 
and lower  halves  of  the  shoe  at home,  to factory work, in which the 
factory owner's  machines  were  used  by the worker  to put  the  shoes 
together  (see Chandler  1977,  p. 54). Even if workers are paid by the 
piece  in  both  cases,  the  firm  is  more  integrated  in  the  latter  case 
because  it owns  more  of  the  machines  used  in production. 
The  examples  above  illustrate  that the  issue  of  ownership  can be 
separated  from  the  issue  of  contractual  compensation.  A  firm  may 
pay another  firm or  person  by the  piece  or a fixed  amount  (salary), 
irrespective  of  the  ownership  of  the  machines.  As Coase  points  out, 
the  benefits  of  integration  must  surely  be  more  than  the  ability to 
choose  a new payment  method.  We assume  that a payment  method, 
2 Richard  Posner,  whose  opinion  on  the  legal  definition  of  ownership  we  solicited, 
has referred  us to the  following  statement  by Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  (1881/1946,  p. 
246):  "But what are the rights of ownership?  They  are substantially the  same as those 
incident  to possession.  Within the  limits prescribed  by policy,  the owner  is allowed  to 
exercise  his natural powers  over the  subject-matter  uninterfered  with, and is more or 
less protected  in excluding  other  people  from such interference.  The  owner is allowed 
to exclude  all, and is accountable  to no one  but him." VERTICAL  AND  LATERAL  INTEGRATION  695 
whether  it be salary compensation  to an employee  in the  integrated 
company  or a price  for goods  to be delivered  between  companies,  is 
some  function  of  the  observable  states of  nature  and  the observable 
performance  of  the  parties  to the  contract.  We  further  assume  that 
integration  in  itself  does  not  make  any  new  variable  observable  to 
both  parties.  Any  audits  that an employer  can have done  of his sub- 
sidiary are also feasible  when  the subsidiary is a separate  company.3 
It may be extremely  costly to write a contract  that specifies  unam- 
biguously  the payments  and actions of all parties in every observable 
state of  nature.  We assume  that integration  in itself does  not change 
the cost of  writing  down  a particular contractual  provision.4  What it 
does  change  is who has control  over those  provisions  not included  in 
the  contract.  Consider,  for  example,  a contract between  a publisher 
and  a  printer  for  a  particular  number  of  copies  of  a book.  If  the 
contract  has  no  provision  for  an  additional  print  run  but  the  pub- 
lisher receives  some  new information  that makes it profitable for an- 
other run, then it is obvious  that the right to decide  whether  or not to 
have  the  run belongs  to the owner  of  the  printing  press.  This  is the 
simplest  possible  illustration  of our assumption  that the owner  of an 
asset has the residual rights of control of that asset, that is, the right to 
control all aspects of the asset that have not been explicitly given away 
by contract. 
C.  Introduction  to the Model 
In order  to be  more  specific about  the costs and benefits  of  integra- 
tion,  it is necessary  to set up  a formal  model  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween  two firms. This  is done  in Section  II.  For simplicity,  the  rela- 
tionship,  which  may be either  vertical or lateral, is assumed  to last 2 
periods.5  In  the  first (i.e.,  the  ex  ante)  period,  the  manager  of  each 
3 Arrow (1975) has analyzed the benefits of vertical integration  based on the assump- 
tion that without integration  it is more costly for one firm to communicate  information 
to another  than with integration.  We do not see why any new method  of communica- 
tion becomes  feasible  under  integration.  The  incentives  of people  to lie may change  if 
their incentive  structure changes,  but Arrow does  not explain  how integration  changes 
the set of  feasible  incentive  structures.  However,  it might  be the case that the right to 
audit  is sometimes  a residual  right  rather than  a contractible  right,  in which case the 
theory  developed  below  can  explain  the  dependence  of  information  on  ownership 
patterns. 
4  Williamson  (1983  pp.  523-24)  gives  an  example  of  a  contract  written  between 
nonintegrated  firms  in  which  there  is no  penalty  for  cancellation.  He  assumes  that 
under  vertical integration,  or via the use of hostages,  it is possible to extract a penalty 
from the buyer when he fails to take delivery of the seller's product. We shall ignore the 
possibility that there  are artificial legal barriers to cancellation  penalties  and that inte- 
gration  is used  by the  parties as a way of getting  around  these. 
5 We  model  the  relationship  as a "once  and  for  all" event.  To  the  extent  that the 
relationship  is repeated,  the  incentives  for vertical integration  may be different  from 696  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
firm makes relationship-specific  investments,  while in the second  (i.e., 
the  ex  post)  period,  some  further  production  decisions  are  taken 
and the benefits  from  the  relationship  are realized.  A basic assump- 
tion of the model  is that the production  decisions,  represented  by q, 
are sufficiently complex  that they cannot be specified completely  in an 
initial  contract  between  the  firms.  We  have  in  mind  a  situation  in 
which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unambig- 
uously  in advance  how all the potentially  relevant aspects of the pro- 
duction allocation should be chosen  as a function  of the many states of 
the  world.  To  simplify,  we  suppose  that  no aspect  of  q  is ex  ante 
contractible.6 The  noncontractibility  of q creates the need  to allocate 
residual  rights  of  control  since,  if  it is  not  specified  how  q  will be 
chosen,  there  must  be  some  implicit  or  explicit  default  that  allows 
some  party  to  choose  the  relevant  components  of  q  in  the  second 
period.  We  assume  that  the  owner  of  each  asset  has  the  right  to 
control  that asset in the case of  a missing  provision. 
Although  q is ex  ante  noncontractible,  we suppose  that, once  the 
state of  the world  is determined,  the  (small number  of)  relevant  as- 
pects of  the  production  allocation  become  clear and  the  parties can 
negotiate  or  recontract  over  these  (costlessly).  That  is, q is ex  post 
contractible.  Since the  parties are assumed  to have  symmetric  infor- 
mation,  costless  recontracting  will always lead  to an ex  post efficient 
allocation, whatever  is the initial allocation of ownership  rights.7 The 
distribution  of ex post surplus,  however,  will be sensitive to ownership 
rights. For example,  in the case of the printer and the publisher, while 
it may be efficient  to have another  print run, the printer will extract 
more  surplus  if he owns  the printing  plant and can therefore  refuse 
to have the additional  printing  if negotiations  fail. 
Through  their  influence  on  the  distribution  of  ex  post  surplus, 
ownership  rights  will  affect  ex  ante  investment  decisions.  That  is, 
although  ex  post  efficiency  (relative  to  investment  decisions)  is 
guaranteed  under any ownership  structure, each ownership  structure 
those  we give  here.  See Telser  (1980)  and  Kreps (1984)  for the  role of  reputation  in 
long-term  relationships  as an enforcement  device and Williamson (1979) for arguments 
on  the  role  of  repetitive  idiosyncratic  purchases  in  providing  a  cost  to  nonvertical 
integration.  None  of  these  papers  deals with the influence  of  reputation  on  the own- 
ership  of  assets. To  the  extent  that reputation  helps  to enforce  implicit  agreements, 
repetition  of the relationship  is likely to increase  the parties' surplus whether  they are 
separate  firms or part of the same firm. It is therefore  unclear  why reputation  should 
have any particular implications  concerning  the ownership  of assets. 
6  See  Grossman  and  Hart  (1984)  for  models  in  which  some  components  of  q are 
contractible  while others  are not. 
7  In a more complex  model  ex post inefficiencies  will also appear in conjunction  with 
costs of renegotiation.  See Grossman and Hart (1984,  sec. 2) for a model of ownership 
in which  ex post inefficiencies  rather than ex ante  inefficiencies  are analyzed. VERTICAL  AND  LATERAL  INTEGRATION  697 
will lead to a (different)  distortion  in ex ante investment.  The  ex ante 
investments  that we are referring  to are those that cannot be specified 
in the contract either because they are too complex  to be described or 
because  they stand for nonverifiable  managerial  effort  decisions.  We 
suppose  that the  parties allocate ownership  rights in such a way that 
the  ex  ante  investment  distortions  are  minimized.  The  implications 
this has  for  the  desirability  of  integration  are the  main  focus  of  the 
paper  and are analyzed  in Section  III. 
It  is  worth  asking  why,  in  the  context  of  our  model,  the  usual 
argument  that the feasible  set can only become  larger under  integra- 
tion  fails. Given  the  existence  of  residual  rights  of  control,  if firm  1 
buys firm 2, the owner  of  firm  1 will have the power  to intervene  in 
firm  2 in ways that  may  distort  the  incentives  of  firm  l's  manager. 
Moreover,  the owner  cannot  commit  himself  to intervene  selectively 
in  his  subsidiary's operations  since  by their  very  definition  residual 
rights refer  to powers  that cannot  be specified  in advance  (at least in 
the detail required  to make them  part of an enforceable  contract). It 
follows  that integration  can impose  costs as well as benefits. 
Since  there  are features  of  our  theory  that lack quantitative  com- 
pleteness,  in Section  IV we show how the theory  can be applied  to a 
particular  industry,  the  insurance  industry.  Finally,  Section  V  con- 
tains conclusions. 
II.  The  Model 
Consider  two  firms,  1 and  2,  engaged  in  a relationship,  which  for 
simplicity we suppose  lasts 2 periods.  We assume that each firm is run 
by a manager  who  receives  the  full  return  from  his firm's activities 
(the reason for this extreme  assumption  will become clear below). The 
firms sign a contract at date 0, and soon after managers  1 and 2 make 
relationship-specific  investments,  denoted  by a1 and a2, respectively. 
At date 1, some further actions q, and q2 are taken and the gains from 
trade are realized.  We write the benefit  of firm i's manager  from the 
relationship  at date  1, net of investment  costs, as 
B,.[a,,  4),(ql,  q2)]  (1 
All costs and  benefits  are measured  in date  1 dollars.  We will often 
interpret  the  relationship  as a vertical one  in which upstream  firm 2 
supplies downstream  firm 1 with an input. In this case B2 <  0 may be a 
cost.  However,  another  interpretation  is  that  the  relationship  is  a 
lateral one,  for example,  between  two retail stores with adjacent loca- 
tions.  For  technical  reasons,  we  have  assumed  that Bi depends  on 
some  function  4X  of  qi  and  q2  and  is increasing  in  X.  We  shall be 698  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
interested  in cases in which there is a conflict of interest in the q's; for 
example,  Bi might  be increasing  in qi and decreasing  in q. 8 
The  q%'s  represent  rights  of  control  over  firm i's assets, which  are 
assumed  to  be  ex  ante  noncontractible  (as  of  date  0)  but  ex  post 
contractible  (as of  date  1). As noted  in the  Introduction,  we have in 
mind  a situation  in which it is extremely  difficult  to think about and 
describe in advance  how the production  allocation should  depend  on 
the  "state of  the  world" but  in  which  it is relatively  easy  to  specify 
production  decisions  ex post once  the state of the world is realized  (a 
more detailed  discussion  of this may be found  in n.  14). Since qi is ex 
ante noncontractible,  it qualifies as a residual right of control, and our 
assumption  is that the owner of firm i has the right to choose it at date 
1. Given that qi is ex post contractible,  however,  firm i's owner may be 
prepared  to give up this right in exchange  for a side payment  as part 
of renegotiation  of  the contract  at date  1. 
The  ex ante investments  ai are also supposed  to be noncontractible 
either  because  they are too complex  to be described  (they are multi- 
dimensional,  not just dollar amounts)  or because they stand for man- 
agerial effort  decisions  that are not verifiable (to third parties, such as 
the courts); for example,  at might be manager  i's effort  in setting up a 
well-functioning  firm. Investment  decisions  are assumed  to be made 
independently  and  noncooperatively  by the two managers just  after 
the contract is signed  at date 0. We shall suppose  that each manager 
observes the other's investment  decision  after it has been made; in this 
model,  there will be no asymmetries  of information  between  the man- 
agers. 
After  investment  decisions  are made  ex  ante and he is determined 
ex post through  the choice of qi and q2, manager i receives the benefit 
BV.  This benefit  is again supposed  to be nonverifiable  and hence  non- 
contractible. That is, Bi is a private benefit, accruing directly to firm i's 
manager,  that does  not show up in firm i's accounts.  For example,  B 
might stand for managerial  perquisites or effort.  A consequence  of B 
and B2's not being verifiable is that it is impossible  to write in the date 
o contract that firm  1, say, should  transfer  its benefit B I to firm 2. 
We can summarize  our  assumptions  so far as follows:  (1) None  of 
the variables a-, qi, and B, is ex ante contractible,  although  the  man- 
agers have symmetric information  about these variables. Hence all the 
date 0 contract can do is to allocate ownership  rights or residual rights 
of control to the two managers.  (2) After the contract is signed, a, and 
a2 are  chosen  simultaneously  and  noncooperatively  by  managers  1 
and  2.  (3) At date  1, the  owner  of  firm i (i.e.,  the manager  who  has 
8  Here ai and qi are vectors in compact subsets of Euclidean  spaces Ai and Qi, respec- 
tively, and Bi and Xi are continuous  functions. VERTICAL  AND  LATERAL  INTEGRATION  699 
been  given  ownership  rights in the date 0 contract) has the right and 
power  to choose  qi.9 If there  is no further  negotiation,  the choices of 
different  owners  are  made  simultaneously  and  noncooperatively. 
Given that the q's become  contractible at date  1, however, the contract 
may be renegotiated  (costlessly). Then  B1 and B2 are realized. 
It should  be  stressed  that we  assume  that  separate  managers  are 
needed  to choose  a- and  a1 under  any ownership  structure  (but see 
Sec. III,  remark  1).10 
Finally, we  assume  that there  is a competitive  market  in identical 
potential  trading  partners  at date  0,  which  determines  the  ex  ante 
division of the surplus  between  the two managers.  Given this ex ante 
division, an optimal  contract simply maximizes  one manager's benefit 
subject to the  other  manager's  receiving  his reservation  utility (note 
that there  is no uncertainty).  We make the standard assumption  that 
the functions  B 1 and B2, as well as the domains  of the variables qi and 
ai, are common  knowledge  at date  0. 
An  example  may  be  useful.  Imagine  that  firm  1 is an  electricity 
generating  plant that is located next to a coal mine in order to use the 
mine's  coal  to  make  electricity  (for  a detailed  analysis of  long-term 
contracts  between  mine-mouth  electricity  generating  plants and coal 
mines,  see Joskow  [1985]).  Let 'I(ql,  q2) represent  the quality of the 
coal delivered.  Suppose  that the boiler firm 1 installs to burn coal does 
not function  well if the coal supplied  is impure.  Ex ante there may be 
many potential  impurities,  and it may be impossible  to allow for each 
of  these  in the  contract.  Ex post,  however,  it may be clear what the 
relevant impurity is-high  ash content,  say. Our supposition  is that, if 
firm  1 owns firm 2, it can, ex  post, exercise  its rights of control  over 
firm 2's assets to direct  that the  coal should  be taken from  a deposit 
with low ash content  (i.e.,  firm  1 chooses  a subvector  of  q2).  In con- 
trast, if firm 2 owns firm 1, it can exercise  its right of control over firm 
l's  assets to direct  that the  boiler  should  be  modified  to accept  coal 
with high  ash content. 
An alternative  to ownership  in this example  is a contract that gives 
firm  1, say, the specific right to direct the areas of the mine in which 
coal is dug out. This  would clearly be reasonable  for any one  particu- 
lar right  of  control.  However,  we  have  in mind  a situation  in which 
there  are many aspects  of  a firm's operations,  each of which  may be 
important  in a different  contingency,  and thus the costs of assigning 
9 We suppose  that  no  special  skills are  required  to choose  qi. This  means  that the 
owner  of  firm z can contract  with a subordinate  to implement  the  choice  of q2; more- 
over, since there are many subordinates  available, none is in a position to refuse to carry 
out  the owner's wishes  or to argue  about terms. 
10  The  contrary assumption  that integration  is useful  because it substitutes one man- 
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specific  rights  of  control  ex  ante  are much  higher  than  the  costs of 
assigning  generalized  control. 
It may be useful  if we comment  briefly on  the  motivation  for our 
assumption  that aj, q1,  and B- are all ex ante noncontractible.  We shall 
see  in  the  next  section  that,  if  either  the  at's or the  qj's are  ex  ante 
contractible, the first-best can be achieved  under any ownership  struc- 
ture, and  so the degree  of  integration  of the firms is irrelevant.  The 
same is true if the Br's  are contractible since in this case the parties can 
always write  a contract  that  transfers  firm i's benefit  to firm j, thus 
removing  all conflicts of interest.  Hence,  in order to develop  an inter- 
esting theory of ownership,  it is necessary to assume that the are's,  q-'s, 
and B,'s are all at least  partly noncontractible.  It is nonetheless  very 
strong to assume that no aspects of these variables are contractible.  In 
any  realistic  situation,  some  parts  of  a  firm's  performance  will  be 
reflected  in verifiable shareholders'  profit, even if other parts, such as 
managerial  well-being,  are  not.  Similarly,  in  a vertical  relationship, 
while the parties may have difficulty in specifying  the quality of input 
to be exchanged  in advance,  they can surely at least contract on  the 
quantity of  input.  While  we  are  confident  that  some  version  of  our 
results will continue  to hold when a,, qi, and B, are partly contractible, 
the  formal  extension  of  our  analysis  to  this  case  is  by  no  means 
straightforward.  As a first step, it therefore  seems reasonable to study 
the case in which  no date  1 variables are contractible  at date  0. 
III.  Analysis  of  the  Optimal  Contract,  Including 
the  Allocation  of  Ownership  Rights 
An optimal  contract  maximizes  one  manager's  benefit  subject to the 
other  manager's  receiving  his reservation  utility.  Given that there  is 
no  uncertainty  and  that  monetary  transfers  are  available,  it follows 
that an optimal  contract must maximize  the total ex ante net benefits 
or surplus  of the two managers, 
BI[al,  4 I(qi,  q2)]  + B2[a2,  42(qi,  q2)].  (2) 
l  Elsewhere we have considered  the effect  of date 0 contractibles for the special case 
in which no revisions  of the date 0 contract are permitted  at date  1 (see Grossman and 
Hart  1984).  In  the  present  model,  however,  in  which  revisions  are  allowed,  the  in- 
troduction  of  contractibles  complicates  matters  greatly.  With a contractible,  not  only 
can the  parties agree  on  a schedule  relating  the  payment  fronj- firm i to firm j to the 
contractible,  but they can also agree  on  a way of  revising  this price schedule  at date  1 
according  to messages  manager  i and manager j send reflecting  the choice of the sunk 
investments  a1, a2 (for an analysis of this in a special case, see Hart and Moore [1985]). 
With no contractibles,  the payment  from firm i to firm j at date  1 is just a constant,  and 
any attempt to make it sensitive  to the environment  will fail since price revisions  are a 
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It is useful  to consider  as a benchmark  the first-best, where  contrary 
to our assumptions  above a, and a2 are verifiable and qi and q2 are ex 
ante contractible. 
DEFINITION.  Let a*,  a*,  q*,  and  q* be the  (assumed  unique)  max- 
imizers of B1  +  B2 subject to a, E A., qi E  Q  (i  =  1, 2). 
The  first-best contract would state that manager  i must choose  a'*  at 
date 0 and q'*  at date  1 (if not he must pay manager  a large penalty) 
and would  specify  a monetary  transfer  between  the two managers. 
In fact it is possible  to achieve  the first-best as long  as the qi are ex 
ante  contractible,  even  if  the  a, are  not.  For if  the  date  0  contract 
specifies that qi =  q:*,  party i has an incentive  to choose  a- to maximize 
B,[a,, <>i(ql,  q2  )], that is, to set ai =  a* 12 If neither  the qi nor the ai are 
ex  ante  contractible,  however,  the  first-best  cannot  generally  be 
achieved,  as we shall now see. 
Under  our simplifying  assumption  that no date  1 variables are con- 
tractible as of date 0, the contract will consist simply of an allocation of 
ownership  rights  and  a  transfer  payment  between  the  managers. 
There  are  three  interesting  cases  to  consider.  In  the  first case,  the 
firms remain  separately  owned  or nonintegrated;  that is, manager  1 
owns  and  controls  firm  l's  assets and  manager  2 owns  and  controls 
firm 2's assets. In the second case, firm 1 owns firm 2; that is, manager 
1 owns  and controls  the assets of both  firms (we call this firm  1 con- 
trol). In the third case, firm 2 owns firm 1 (we call this firm 2 control). 
There  is a fourth  case in which  manager  1 owns  firm 2's assets and 
manager  2 owns firm l's assets. This case appears less interesting  than 
the others since it seems likely in practice to give a much lower level of 
surplus  than case  1. We therefore  ignore  it in what follows.13 
A.  Case 1:  Nonintegration 
In this case manager  1 has the right to choose  qi and manager  2 has 
the right to choose  q2 at date  1. It is useful  to start at date  1 and work 
backward. At date  1, a1 and a2 are predetermined,  and the only ques- 
tion concerns  the choices of qi and q2. If no further  negotiation  takes 
place, qi  and q2 will be chosen  simultaneously  and noncooperatively 
by managers  1 and 2 to maximize f I  (q , q2) and 42(ql,  q2),  respectively 
(since Bi is increasing  in  ).  We make the following  assumption. 
ASSUMPTION  1.  There  exists a unique  pair (q1, q2)  satisfying:  q,  = 
12 This depends  on our simplifying  assumption  that at does not affect Bj. The  results 
presented  below can be extended  to the case of externalities  in the a's without difficulty. 
13  There  is also a class of  more  complicated  contracts  that make asset ownership  at 
date  1 a  function  of  messages  the  managers  of  firms  i and j  send  after  they  have 
observed  each  other's  investment  decision.  An  example  of  this  is an  option  to  own 
contract.  Our  results  are  not  affected  by the  existence  of  such  contracts,  and  so for 
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ql  maximizes  lI(qi,  q2)  subject to qi  E  Q1, and  q2  =  2  maximizes 
I(q,  q2)  subject to q2  E  Q2. 
In other words the game in which each manager  i maximizes 4e has 
a unique  Nash equilibrium.  Note  the role of the separability assump- 
tion on B.; it ensures  that qjI and  12  are independent  of a,  and a2. 
Of course,  given a,  and a2, the noncooperative  equilibrium  (qI,  '2) 
is unlikely  to be ex  post efficient  in the sense  of  maximizing 
BI[al,  4I(qi,  q2)]  +  B2[a2,  (2(qi,  q2)].  (3) 
Therefore,  the  two  parties  can  gain  from  writing  a new  contract  at 
date  1 that specifies  that q,  =  ql(al,  a2), q2  =  q2(al, a2), where  these 
are the maximizers  of (3) (if there are several maximizers,  choose  any 
pair). We will use  the  notation  q  (c=  ,  q2) and q(a)  [q1(a), q2(a)], 
where a  =  (a,, a2). The  new contract is feasible since qi and q2 are ex 
post contractible.  It will specify  a transfer  price p that serves to allo- 
cate the gains from renegotiation.  Because  we do not want to get into 
the details of contract  renegotiation,  we shall simply assume  that the 
parties  split the  increase  in total surplus  50:50;  that is, the  transfer 
price p satisfies 
Bl{al,  4 I[q(a)]}  -  p  =  Bl[a1,  l(qf)] +  1/2(B1{al, 4j[q(a)]} 
+  B2{a2, M2[q(a)]} -  B1[al, 4(l(qP]  (4) 
-B2[a2,  ?2(q)])  -l(a,  q), 
p  +  B2{a2,  M2[q(a)]}  =  B2[a2,  +2(q)]  +  '/2(Bl{al,  41[q(aff} 
+  B2{a2, M2[q(a)]} -  BI[al,  Xl(41)]  (5) 
-B2[a2,  +2(q)])  -2(a,  q). 
This  is in fact the Nash bargaining  solution.  Note  that most bargain- 
ing solutions  will yield  an ex  post  Pareto-optimal  outcome  given  our 
assumptions  that the parties have the same information  and that bar- 
gaining  (i.e.,  contract  renegotiation)  is costless  (see,  e.g.,  Rubinstein 
1982). It should be clear from what follows that our results will gener- 
alize to many other  divisions  of  the  surplus. 
We assume that a, and a2 are chosen  noncooperatively  by the agents 
at date 0, taking into account  the renegotiation  at date  1, that is, with 
regard to the overall payoffs  El and  t2.  A Nash  equilibrium  in date 0 
investments  is a pair (al,  a2)  E AI  x  A2 such that 
t( I(a  I2,  a  2)  t 1(ai, a2, q)  for all a1 E  Al,  (6) 
U2(aI, a2,  Uj)  il(a1,  a2, q)  for all a2 E A2.  (7) 
The  total  ex  ante  surplus  from  the  relationship  in  this  equilibrium  is 
then 
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A sufficient  condition  for the existence  of a Nash equilibrium  in date 
o investments  is that Ai is convex  and  (i is concave  in ai (i  =  1, 2). 
We have seen  how to compute  total surplus in the case of noninte- 
gration. 14  This will generally be less than the first-best level of surplus 
since the ex ante investments  will be inefficient.  To see this, note that 
the first-order  conditions  for a Nash  equilibrium  are 
___=  2  daB [ai. 4i(q)]  +  1  dBZ  i  ,i[q(a)]}  =  0,  i  =  1, 2,  (9)  daa  2  Oaa  2  daa 
where  we  are  using  the  envelope  theorem  to  eliminate  remaining 
terms involving  the ex post efficient  q(a). This contrasts with the first- 
order  conditions  for  the solution  of  (2), 
J{ai,  4)[q(a)]}  =  O  i  =  1, 2.  (10) 
aa, 
The  inefficiency  arises,  then,  because  manager  i  puts  50  percent 
weight  on  the  noncooperative  outcome  q, which  is generally  ex  post 
inefficient,  instead  of  all  the  weight  on  the  cooperative  outcome, 
which  is ex  post  efficient;  this  is in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  non- 
cooperative  outcome  never  occurs!  To  the  extent  that the  marginal 
and total benefits of a- move in the same direction,  the choice of the ai 
can  be  substantially  distorted.  It  is worth  emphasizing  that  in  this 
model  all the inefficiency  is due to the wrong choice of ex ante invest- 
ment  levels.  The  assumption  of  costless  renegotiation  ensures  that 
there  is no  ex  post  inefficiency,  and  so if ex  ante  investments  (more 
14  The  reader  may be concerned  about our assumption  that the manager  can think 
clearly enough  about q to solve (6) but that it is too costly to contract for q or design  a 
mechanism  to  implement  a particular  q.  This  assumption  can  be  understood  if  we 
imagine  that the  noncontractible  represents  a special service that will be required  of a 
firm at date  1 and that the type of service that is appropriate  depends  on the realization 
of a state of nature.  Let there be N states of nature. The  states are defined  in such a way 
that state s requires the choice of activities from an M-dimensional  space denoted  by Q'. 
The  idea is that different  activities are required  for different  states; i.e., while elements 
of  Q,, Q, s #&  t, are both M-dimensional  Euclidean  vectors,  their coordinates  refer  to 
entirely  distinct  activities  (different  machines,  e.g.).  Further,  in  state  s,  the  benefit 
function  B  is assumed  to  depend  on  the  noncontractibles  only  through  the  chosen 
element  q. in Q5, say B  =  B(a, qs; s); if in state s some vector of activities in Q, is chosen, 
t #  s, no benefits  are derived.  Suppose  in addition that we can normalize  the spaces of 
activities  so  that  B(a,  q5, s)  =  B(a,  q),  where  q  lies  in  a  single  space  Q (where  the 
coordinates  of q, of course,  continue  to refer  to different  activities in different  states). 
Then,  from an ex ante point of view, the manager,  taking each s as equally likely, thinks 
of  his objective as B(a, q), where  q is a typical value assigned  to the vector q,. Further, 
any element  q in Q is contractible  ex post (so that ownership  has some value). However, 
to make q ex ante contractible,  it would be necessary to specify different  coordinates  of 
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precisely the noncontractible  ones) are unimportant,  the first-best can 
always be achieved.'5 
B.  Case 2: Firm 1 Control 
In  this case  firm  1 owns  firm  2,  and  so  manager  1 has the  right  to 
choose  q,  and q2 at date  1. At date  1, manager  1 will now choose  (ql, 
q2)  to maximize 'kI if no further  negotiation  takes place. We make the 
following  assumption. 
AssUMPTION  2.  There  is a unique  pair  (ql,  q2) such  that  (q1, q2) 
solves: maximize  4l(qi,  q2)  subject to (ql,  q2)  E  Q1  X  Q2. 
The  pair (qI, q2)  will generally  not be ex post Pareto optimal, and so 
recontracting  at date  1 will lead to the pair qI(a), q2(a), as in the case of 
nonintegration.  We will continue to assume that the parties split the gains 
from renegotiation  50:50.  That  is, owning  an additional  firm increases a 
manager's bargaining  power only by raising his status quo utility, that 
is, his utility in the event  of no renegotiation  (relative to given a,  and 
a2). Given the 50 percent sharing rule, manager i's final payoff is as in 
(4)-(5)  with (qI, q2) replacing (q ,  '2).  The  date 0 Nash equilibrium in 
investments  and  the  final level  of  surplus  are also defined  as in the 
case  of  nonintegration,  again  with  (ql,  q)  replacing  (  q1, 4).  Firm 
1 control  will generally  lead  to inefficient  ex  ante  investments  since 
(q1, q2)  $  [qI(a), q2(a)] (see  [9]-[10]). 
C.  Case 3: Firm 2 Control 
In this case,  firm 2 owns  firm  1, and  so manager  2 has the  right to 
choose  q, and q2 at date  1. Now, at date  1, manager  2 will choose  (ql, 
q2)  to maximize  42  if no further  negotiation  takes place. We make the 
following  assumption. 
AsSUMPTION  3.  There  is a unique  pair  (ql,  92)  such  that  (ql,  q2) 
solves: maximize  (2(qi,  q2)  subject to (ql,  q2)  E  Qi  Ix  Q2 
This case is the same as the previous one with (ql, 92) replacing  (q1, 
q2)  everywhere.  Again  ex  ante  investments  will generally  be  ineffi- 
cient. 
We  consider  now  which  of  the  three  cases  above  represents  the 
optimal ownership  structure. We saw in (9) that the inefficiency  in the 
a's  is  due  to  the  fact  that  manager  i  puts  50  percent  weight  on 
the noncooperative  solution  (q1, 42)-which  equals (q1, 42) under non- 
15  The  result  that  the  conflict  over  the  division  of  surplus  at date  I can  lead  to  a 
distortion  in investment  at date  0 is similar to the finding  of Grout (1984).  In Grout's 
model,  however,  investment  expenditure  is observable,  there  are no noncontractibles, 
and  the  inefficiency  in ex  ante  investment  results  from  the  assumed  impossibility  of 
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integration,  (qj, q2) under  firm  1 control,  and  (ql,  q2)  under  firm 2 
control-instead  of  100  percent  on  the  cooperative  solution  [ql(a), 
q2(a)]. It is clear,  therefore,  that if one  of  the  pairs (jl,  q2),  (qi,  q2), 
(ql,  q2) happens  to be very close to [ql(a), q2(a)], there will be little in- 
efficiency  in the  a's and  the  corresponding  ownership  structure  will 
achieve approximately  the first-best. Examples of this are provided  in 
proposition  1. 
PROPOSITION  1.  (A)  Suppose  that  i, depends  primarily  on  qi  in 
the  sense  that 41(ql,  q2)  =  o1(ql)  +  Elpil(q2),  (P2(ql,  q2)  =  Ox2(q2) + 
E2032(ql), where  E1,  E2 >  0 are small. Then  nonintegration  yields ap- 
proximately  the first-best, while firm 1 and firm 2 control generally do 
not. (B) Suppose  that +2  hardly depends  on q, and q2 in the sense that 
4+2(ql,  q2)  =  t2  +  E282(ql,  q2),  where E2  >  0  is small. Then firm 1 
control  yields approximately  the  first-best, while nonintegration  and 
firm 2 control  generally  do not.  (C) Suppose  that 4)l hardly depends 
on qi and q2 in the sense that  I(qi, q2)  =  Ox  +  EIbI(qi,  q2),  where EI > 
0  is small.  Then  firm  2  control  yields  approximately  the  first-best, 
while  nonintegration  and  firm  1 control  generally  do not. 
To understand  (and establish) part A, note that, under  nonintegra- 
tion,  manager  1 chooses  q,  =  ql  to maximize  oal(q1)  and manager  2 
chooses  q2  =  q2 to maximize  oi2(q2).  If A holds, however,  it is clear that 
in the limit  E1  =  E2  =  0 and q, is ex post efficient;  that is, [ql(a),  q2(a)] 
-  (4j,  '2)  for all a, and a2. Hence  (4)-(5)  imply that in the limit a, =  Alt 
maximizes  B[a1,  ot4(qi)],  and  so  a1  =  al  and  a2  =  a2 are  ex  ante 
efficient.  Therefore,  by continuity,  for El  and E2 small, nonintegration 
achieves  approximately  the first-best. 
Firm 1 or firm 2 control, in contrast, may lead to great inefficiencies 
in  case  A.  Under  firm  1 control,  in  the  absence  of  renegotiation, 
manager  1 chooses  q,  =  ql  to  maximize  oti(ql)  (which  is  ex  post 
efficient)  and q2  =  q2 to maximize PI  (q2) (which is ex post inefficient). 
This means that in the limit EI  =  E2  =  0, a1 is chosen efficiently, but a2 
is chosen  to maximize 
1/2B2[a2,  a-2(q2)] 
+  '/2B2[a2,  u2(q2)],  (11) 
which may be very inefficient  if q2 is far from q2.  Similarly under firm 
2 control,  a2 is chosen  efficiently  while a1 is not. 
Parts B and C follow similarly. Under  B, firm 2 cares little about q, 
and q2, and so if firm 1 has control over these, it will make an approxi- 
mately ex post efficient  choice. This will in turn lead to approximately 
ex ante efficient  choices of a1 and a2. Under  C, firm 2 control over q 
and q2 leads to approximately  efficient  ex post and ex ante outcomes. 
Proposition  1 says that if the noncontractibles  q, (I =  1 or 2) have a 
small effect  on  firm j's benefit  Bj, it is efficient  for  firm i to control 
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in such a way that i's ex ante expenditure  is distorted,  while if i owns 
them,  there will be only a negligible  distortion  inj's  investment  (since 
j does  not care about them).  Note  that j's ownership  of qi will lead to 
a  serious  distortion  in  i's  expenditure  only  if  a2B,[ai,  kz(q)]/dqjaa, 
is large,  that  is,  if  the  marginal  product  of  a, is  sensitive  to  q,.  If 
B.[a-, ?i(q)]  = fi(a,)  +  44(qj), say, there is no distortion  at all. To  put it 
another  way, proposition  1 tells us only  that a particular ownership 
structure is optimal.  It does not quantify the costs of being at a subop- 
timal  structure.  However,  by  choosing  (a/aqj)(aBJ/aa-) appropriately, 
we may easily construct examples  in which this loss is extremely  large. 
REMARK  1. An  interesting  application  of  proposition  1 is  to  the 
special case in which one manager,  manager  1, say, can run both firms 
by himself  without  any loss in efficiency  (as in Aron  [1984] and Mann 
and Wissink [1984]); that is, the firms may be engaged  in complemen- 
tary activities, and  manager  1 may have  some  spare  "capacity." This 
case can be captured  by supposing  that B2 is approximately  zero. We 
see from proposition  1 that under  these conditions  firm 1 control will 
dominate  nonintegration  or firm 2 control. 
Proposition  1 deals with the special case in which the noncontract- 
ibles are important  to one  party but not to another.  In general,  both 
parties  will  care  about  the  noncontractibles,  and,  as  a  result,  each 
ownership  structure  will lead  to a distortion  in ex  ante  investments. 
The  crucial question  then  is, Which ownership  structure leads to the 
least  significant  distortion?  Progress  can be  made  in  the  analysis of 
this if we make some  further  assumptions.  Recall that Bi[ai, Xi(qi,  q2)] 
is increasing  in  4y  We now  make the  following  assumptions. 
AssUMPTION  4.  Investment  decisions  are  scalars  and  A1, A2 are 
intervals of  the  real line. 
AssUMPTION  5. 
doat  [a.,  Xi-(qj,  q2)]  >  0. 
That  is, marginal  benefit  is high  when  average  benefit  is high. 
AsSUMPTION  6. 
2as  [ar, 4,(qj,  q2)]  <  0. 
AsSUMPTION  7. The  maximizers  q1(a) and q2(a) of (3) are indepen- 
dent  of  (a,,  a2) in the  relevant  range;  we write them  as q* and q*. 
The  fourth  of these  is a strong  assumption.  It says that the ex post 
efficient  choice  of  the  noncontractibles  is  independent  of  ex  ante 
actions.  The  assumption  is  not  reasonable  if BI  and B2 are  differ- 
entiable  functions  of  the q's. However,  it may hold  if the q's take on 
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generalized  to the case in which assumption  7 is violated, at the cost of 
additional  complexity. 
The  first-order  conditions  for the  choice  of ex ante investment  by 
the managers  are given  by (9), where  we replace  Xi(q) by 4j =  (tj(qj, 
q2), the prerenegotiation  outcome.  Given assumption  7, (9) therefore 
becomes 
1 8B 
k,4 
1  OB 
2  daa (  c)  +  -  (,  a  *)  0,  (12) 
where  *  =  +j(q*,  q*).  On  the other  hand,  the first-best investment 
decisions  are characterized  by 
(Bi  ,  )  =  0.  (13) 
Using  assumption  5, we see that the left-hand  side of  (12) is positive 
(respectively negative)  at at =  a* if H>  4+ (<4w). Hence,  by assump- 
tion 6, 
a*  as  H  (14) 
Proposition  1 dealt  with  the  case  in  which  one  of  the  ownership 
structures  gave  rise to a (h1,  I2) very close  to  (q*, q*).  Our  concern 
now, however,  is with cases in which ($jl,  '2),  (ql,  q2), and  (qj, q2)  are 
all quite  "far" from  (q *, q*).  We illustrate  the  situation  in figure  1. 
The  curve  represents  the  efficient  42  -  M1  combinations.  We have 
drawn it to be continuous,  but it could equally well be a set of discrete 
points.  If  firm  1 or firm  2 has control,  the  noncooperative  outcome 
(1,  P2) will  lie on  the  efficiency  frontier  since one  party controls  qi 
and  q2.  Under  nonintegration,  in contrast,  the  noncooperative  out- 
come  (4l,  42)  may well be  highly  inefficient  because  of  the  uncoor- 
dinated  choice  of  (qj, q2). 
We  can  use  figure  1 to  determine  the  nature  of  the  investment 
distortions  corresponding  to  the  different  ownership  structures. 
Since $1 >  (+* and k2<  (2*, (14) implies that al > a* anda2  <  a*; that 
is, under  firm 1 control,  firm 1 overinvests  relative to the first-best and 
firm 2 underinvests. On the other hand, since 41 < 4)  and (2  >  44* 
(14) implies  that, under  firm 2 control,  firm 2 overinvests  relative  to 
the  first-best and  firm  1 underinvests.  Nonintegration  is more  com- 
plicated since the nature of the distortion  depends  on the relationship 
of  (41, $2)  to (4l,  44)  However, if the outcome (4i,  $2)  is highly 
inefficient-which  seems  plausible in a number  of cases-it  will quite 
likely lie to the southwest of (44l, 44), that is, 4l  < 44 and 42  <  44. 
Hence  in this case 'a  < a4 and a2  <  a*; that is, nonintegration  leads to 
underinvestment  by both firms. 
It may be useful  to put these results in words. Under  firm i control, 708  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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firm i has a great deal of power ex post and hence  will receive a high 
benefit  in  any date  1 renegotiation.  Under  assumption  5,  however, 
high  total benefits  go  together  with high  marginal  benefits  of invest- 
ment, and so the consequence  will be that firm i will overinvest.  Firm]j, 
on the other hand, with a low total and marginal benefit, will underin- 
vest.  Nonintegration,  in contrast,  gives  both  firms some  power  and 
will lead to moderate  investment  levels by each (note that, if  $2  >  (P2 
and $1 >  +1,  then  A2  >  a2 and al  >  a,;  i.e., firm i's investment  under 
nonintegration  is greater  than  under  firm j control). 
The  trade-offs  should  now  be  fairly clear.  Firm  1 control  will be 
desirable  when  firm  l's  ex  ante investment  is much  more  important 
than firm 2's (so that firm 2's underinvestment  under firm 1 control is 
relatively  unimportant)  and  when  overinvestment  by  firm  1 under 
firm 1 control is a less severe problem  than underinvestment  by firm 1 
as in, for example,  the nonintegrated  solution.  Firm 2 control will be 
desirable  when  firm 2's investment  decision  is much  more  important 
than  firm  l's  and  when  overinvestment  by  firm"2  is  a  less  severe 
problem  than underinvestment.  Finally, nonintegration  is desirable if 
a, and a2 are both "important" in some sense, so that it is preferable  to 
have both of them  at a medium  level than to have one very high and 
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It is worth  emphasizing  that, because  of  the overinvestment  prob- 
lem,  we cannot  be  sure  that  firm  1 control  will be desirable  even  if 
firm 2's investment  is irrelevant;  that is, aB2/aa2  =0.  The  overinvest- 
ment  effect  is a consequence  of  our  assumption  that the  benefits  Bj 
accrue to manager]  and are inalienable  from  him.  In a slight variant 
of our model,  however,  B2, say, is perfectly  alienable in the sense that 
there is a way for manager  1 to capture B2 as long as he controls firm 
2's assets.  Under  these  conditions,  the  overinvestment  effect  disap- 
pears. 
In particular, let B2 =  f2[a2,  2(ql,  q2)] -  C2(aO), where2  is a date  1 
variable benefit and C2 is a sunk investment  cost. Imagine  that, if firm 
1 owns  firm  2's assets,  manager  1 has the  option  at date  1 of  firing 
manager  2 and  replacing  him by another  equally skilled manager  at 
date  1 (training is unimportant),  and this new manager can be offered 
a  contract  that  pays  him  -f2  (for  simplicity,  we  suppose  that  the 
opportunity  costs of both  the old  and new  managers  are zero).  This 
means that if firm  l's manager  has control,  his benefit becomes B  1 + 
f2;  that is, the benefits2  is transferred.  The  fact that manager 2 will not 
receive  /2  will,  of  course,  have  a very  adverse  effect  on  his  date  0 
incentives.  However,  in the case in which  manager  2's date  0 invest- 
ments are unimportant,  it is clear that firm  1 control  will achieve  the 
first-best  since  firm  1 will face  the  social objective  function.  We  see 
then  that  the  alienability  of  Bj and  the  irrelevance  of  a1 are jointly 
sufficient  conditions  for firm i control  to be optimal.'6 
REMARK  2. One simplifying  assumption  we have made is that, when 
firm i owns firm J, it can control all the residual rights, q1. In reality, a 
subvector q. of q%  may always remain under  the control of manager], 
say because manager]  is the only person with the ability to control this 
particular  aspect  of  the  firm's operation.  Our  analysis can  easily be 
generalized  to  this  case.  The  main  difference  is  that,  even  under 
integration,  the prerenegotiation  choice of (qj, q)  will involve a lack of 
coordination  by firms 1 and 2. Note that ownership  rights are likely to 
be less important  the more components  of q%  remain under  manager 
]'s  control.  For  example,  suppose  firm ]  is a law firm  with  a single 
lawyer and firm i is firm's  single client. Then  if the client buys the law 
firm he  may no  more  be able to get  the  lawyer to provide  a special 
service than if the lawyer were in private practice. That is, the value of 
controlling  firm ]'s  assets may be very small in this case. 
16  In practice,  the  replacement  of  a manager  may well be publicly observable  and, 
hence,  a contractible.  So that we can stick with our  framework  in which  there  are no 
contractibles,  we suppose  that a replacement  involves  a move  from one job  to another 
in the company,  which may not be verifiable (the manager  may be "kicked upstairs" to a 
job  with no perquisites,  e.g.).  That  is, a replacement  is part of the noncontractible  q2. 710  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
IV.  An Application 
The  main result of the last section can be stated as follows. If total and 
marginal  benefits  of  investment  move  together,  firm i ownership  of 
firms i and j will lead  to overinvestment  by firm i and  underinvest- 
ment by firmj.  On the other hand, nonintegration  will lead to moder- 
ate investment  levels by each firm. The  optimal  ownership  structure 
will be chosen  to minimize  the  overall  loss  in surplus  due  to invest- 
ment distortions.  We now apply this result to the insurance  industry. 
Any real industry  is, of course,  far more complex  than our model. 
One  important  difference  is that  in  practice  some  variables  will be 
contractible  at  date  0.  We  will  therefore  interpret  our  model  with 
considerable  latitude  in what follows. 
In  the  insurance  industry  some  firms have  a sales force  that sells 
primarily its own company's  products.'7  These  companies  are called 
direct writers, and their  sales force  may include  employees  (with vir- 
tually  no  ownership  rights  to  office  equipment)  or  agents  who  are 
independent  contractors  (who  may own  their  office  equipment  and 
the building  housing  their  agency  office).  Aside  from  the ownership 
of  some  office  equipment,  there  are  no  major differences  between 
employees  and  nonemployees;  typically,  both  are  on  commissions, 
and the differences  in commissions  between  the two types just reflect 
in an obvious  way the  differences  in who  bears office  expenditures. 
However,  in all cases direct writers are distinguished  by the fact that 
the insurance  company  and not the agent owns the list of policyhold- 
ers. Ownership  of the list of policyholders  entitles the insurance  com- 
pany to sell insurance  to the policyholder  if the agent  terminates  the 
relationship  with  the  insurance  company.  Insurance  company  own- 
ership  of the list also means  that the agent  has no right to renew  the 
insurance  policy with a different  company;  he cannot  leave the com- 
pany and take his clients with him. 
Insurance  companies  that  are  not  direct  writers  sell  insurance 
through  independent  agents  and  brokers  (whom  we  will lump  to- 
gether  as independent  agents  in  distinction  to  the  "captive" agents 
discussed  above).  The  independent  agents  are distinguished  by the 
fact that they,  rather  than  the  insurance  company,  own  the  list. An 
independent  agent  can  sell any insurance  company's  product  to his 
client. If the agent  terminates  his relationship  with a particular insur- 
ance company,  that company  has no right to solicit the business  from 
17  Our statements  about the structure of the insurance  industry are based on Strick- 
ler  (1981),  Webb  et al. (1984),  and  conversations  with professionals  in the  insurance 
industry.  We  are  very  grateful  to  Naava  Grossman  for  her  help  in  finding  general 
information  and data sources and for providing  general information  herself. We would 
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the  agent's  list.  Even  without  termination  of  the  relationship,  if the 
agent  thinks  that  a client  would  be  happier  with  the  insurance  of 
another  company,  the agent  can encourage  the client to change  com- 
panies. 
An  insurance  company  has a number  of  expenditures  that, given 
characteristics  of  the  (contractible)  commission  structure  to  be  ex- 
plained below, can create ex post surplus between  the insurance  com- 
pany and its agents  or brokers.  These  expenditures  include  training 
of agents, client list-building  expenditures  (such as advertising),  prod- 
uct development,  and  policyholder  services.  An insurance  agent  can 
have similar expenditures.  To the extent that the efforts  of the parties 
in  generating  these  expenditures  are  not  verifiable,  they  cannot  be 
reimbursed  directly  without  the  creation  of  moral  hazards.  Instead 
the contract between  the parties will specify payments as a function  of 
observables,  for example,  commissions  to the agent  for  policies  pro- 
duced  for the insurance  company. 
We  will  use  our  framework  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  who 
owns  the  list of  policyholders.  (We  assume  that the  agent  does  not 
want to own the whole  insurance  company.)  Note  that, since there  is 
only  one  asset here  (namely  the  client  list), the  choice  is, in the  lan- 
guage  of  our  model,  between  firm  1 control  and  firm  2  control. 
Nonintegration  has  no  meaning.  To  proceed,  we  must  provide  a 
model  of  the  insurance  industry.  Space  limitations  permit  only  the 
simplest  model.  We assume  that the agent  devotes  effort  that is not 
verifiable to acquiring and keeping  clients. The  greater this effort,  the 
more  likely  it is that  a typical client  will renew  his insurance  in  the 
future,  that is, that he will be persistent.  Examples  of such effort  are 
the  care with which  the  agent  tailors the  initial policy to the  client's 
needs  and  the  efficiency  with  which  he  deals  with  a claim  once  the 
policy is in force.  Note  that it is important  for what follows  that this 
effort  yield  dividends  in  the  future,  not just  at the  time  when  it is 
incurred;  for  example,  a claim  dealt  with speedily  today  is likely to 
encourage  the  client  to renew  next  year and  the year after.  To  sim- 
plify the exposition,  we assume  that the agent  can either  "work" and 
produce  only persistent  clients or "not work" and produce  only tem- 
porary clients,  and that, if effort  were verifiable,  the insurance  com- 
pany would be prepared  to compensate  the agent for the extra effort 
of  delivering  persistent  clients.  An  immediate  implication  of  these 
assumptions  is that,  if the  agent  is paid  a commission  for  the  initial 
acquisition  of the client and no later commission  as a function  of the 
persistence  of  the  client,  then  the  agent  will deliver  only  temporary 
clients, and this is inefficient  relative to the first-best. (Note  that simi- 
lar incentive  problems  will arise  if  some  clients  are  naturally  more 
persistent  than  others  and  the  agent  must  devote  extra  effort  to 712  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
finding the  more  persistent  clients;  the  analysis below  applies  also to 
this case.) 
In order to induce  the agent to produce  persistent clients, the com- 
mission  structure  must  be  back-loaded  to  reward  the  agent's  initial 
effort  costs.  Specifically,  the  agent  must  get  an  initial  commission 
somewhat  lower  than  the  acquisition  cost of  a client but get renewal 
commissions  that are in excess of the agent's servicing costs associated 
with obtaining  the  renewal;  that is, the renewal  premium  must have 
some  component  of  a reward  for  the  effort  of  delivering  persistent 
clients. 
The  back-loading  of commissions,  in and of itself, has no particular 
implication  for  who  owns  the list, unless  there  are noncontractibles. 
We will be concerned  with two kinds  of  noncontractibles  that could 
interfere  with  the  commission  structure  above:  (1)  noncontractibles 
that can hurt the agent  if the company  owns the list and  (2) noncon- 
tractibles that can hurt the company  if the agent  owns the list. 
Important  examples  of  type  1 have  to  do  with  the  fact  that  the 
insurance  company  can make the product  it is selling less competitive 
(e.g., by raising its price or lowering  the quality of its services relative 
to other  insurance  companies)  and hence  make the client more likely 
to  want  to  switch  insurance  companies.  For  example,  an  insurance 
company  can decide  that it does  not want to insure  automobiles  in a 
particular  region,  so  it  raises  its  prices  or  lowers  the  quality  of  its 
services in that region.  Or the insurance company can change the type 
and quality of its advertising,  which affects the likelihood  that a client 
will renew  his policy.  It is very difficult  for an insurance  company  to 
write  a  contract  with  agents  that  specifies  all  the  relevant  ways  in 
which, and contingencies  under  which, the company  will support  the 
competitive  position  of  its particular  products;  that is, these  actions 
really are noncontractible.  Such noncontractibles  can seriously distort 
the agent's effort  decision  if the firm owns the list and the commission 
structure is back-loaded.  In particular, once the commission  structure 
is back-loaded,  the agent  will lose the renewal  premium  and thus be 
unable  to  recover  his  cost  of  delivering  persistent  clients  when  the 
company  takes actions that lead the client to want to switch insurance 
companies.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  agent  owns  the  list, then  the 
back-loading  of the commission  structure does  not distort the agent's 
action  because  the  agent  can  switch  the  client  to another  company 
when  the first company  is a bad match for the client.  In the notation 
of our model,  this is a case in which the q of the insurance company is 
very important  for the agent's ex ante effort. 
There  are also type 2 noncontractibles,  that is, noncontractibles  that 
can hurt the company  if the agent owns the list. First, if the company 
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clients  cannot  be  solicited  without  the  agent's  permission  when  the 
agent  owns  the  list.  Second,  when  the  agent  owns  the  list,  he  can 
encourage  his clients to switch to other companies  if this seems advan- 
tageous  (to him or to them).  In some states of the world, such a switch 
may be efficient,  but in other  states it will merely increase the agent's 
profits  at  the  expense  of  those  of  the  company.  The  ability of  the 
agent  to  switch customers  in  this  way will distort  the  company's  ex 
ante investments.18 
So the trade-off  between  the different  ownership  structures is as in 
Section  III.  As in that section,  we suppose  that marginal benefits  are 
small when average benefits  are small. It follows that, if the company 
owns  the  list, the  agent  will have  an insufficient  incentive  to deliver 
persistent clients; that is, he will underinvest  in this activity. The  com- 
pany, on  the other  hand,  will have at least the socially correct incen- 
tive  to  invest  in  list building  and  similar  activities;  that  is,  it will if 
anything  overinvest  in these  activities.  In contrast,  if the agent  owns 
the  list, the  company  will underinvest  in list building,  but the  agent 
will work hard to deliver  persistent  clients. 
Further understanding  about list ownership  can be gained  by con- 
sidering  what  would  happen  if  the  reason  for  the  back-loading  of 
commissions  disappeared.  Recall that the back-loading  was necessary 
because  (a) the agent  devoted  nonverifiable  effort  to the servicing  of 
clients and (b) the persistence  of the client was sensitive to this effort. 
Much  can  be  explained  by  noting  that  some  kinds  of  insurance 
policies are more likely to be renewed  than others,  and this can make 
reason  b much  less of a factor. An example  is "whole life" insurance. 
A life insurance  policy will involve  a longer-term  contract than auto- 
mobile insurance  or fire and casualty insurance  because a short-term 
policy gives very little protection  to a person  against the event that he 
will be sick but not die during  the term of the life insurance policy and 
then be uninsurable  thereafter.  As a result, a life insurance  customer 
has less  of  a tendency  to  switch  insurance  companies  than  does  an 
automobile  insurance  customer.  Moreover,  to the extent  that life in- 
surance  renewals  do  not occur,  it is not because  the agent  has given 
the customer  bad service on  his claims! When  renewals  are relatively 
18  In each of the examples  of  noncontractibles  we have indicated  actions each party 
could take that would put the other party at a disadvantage.  In some of these cases, e.g., 
the insurance  company  changing  the support  it provides  to a given  product,  the non- 
contractible  action  does  not  involve  direct  manipulation  of  the  item  of  which  we are 
trying to explain  the ownership,  namely the client list. We have taken as given that the 
insurance  agent  does  not want to own the whole  insurance  company.  Hence  the  rele- 
vant variable that will allow the agent to increase his control over the renewal premiums 
to be  generated  by a particular  client  is the  ownership  of  the  list rather  than  direct 
control  over  the  insurance  company's  marketing  and  product  support  program. 714  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
insensitive  to the agent's  actions,  the commission  structure  need  not 
be as back-loaded,  and hence  the argument  for the agent  to own the 
list is weakened.  Further,  even  with some  back-loading,  to the extent 
that one  company's  q's do  not  affect  the  desire  of  a client  to switch 
given  that  his  insurance  is a long-term  contract,  the  agent  has less 
need  to own the list (see proposition  1). 
Our  analysis therefore  predicts  that,  in products  in which  the  re- 
newal  is not  guaranteed  and  is sensitive  to  the  agent's  actions,  the 
agent will be more likely to own the list, whereas in products in which 
the renewal is more certain and is less sensitive to the agent's actions, 
the  company  will be more  likely to own  the list. We now argue  that 
these  predictions  are consistent  with  facts characterizing  the  insur- 
ance industry. 
One  important  fact  is that  about  65  percent  of  the  premiums  in 
property-casualty  insurance  are  generated  by  agents  who  own  the 
client  list, while  in life  insurance  about  12 percent  of  the  premiums 
are generated  by agents  who  own  the  list.19 Most property-casualty 
insurance  is sold for a shorter term than most life insurance.  Table  1 
gives a more detailed  breakdown  for life insurance.  It can be seen that 
term insurance  is sold  far more  often  by agents  who retain list own- 
ership than is whole life insurance.  Note that term life insurance is for 
a period of a few years and then must be renewed.  Hence the renewal 
is more  important  for  term than  for whole  life insurance. 
Another  important  fact is that there is great variation regarding  list 
ownership  among  products  in  the  property-casualty  product  area. 
For  example,  independent  agents  have  a  47  percent  share  of  the 
market  for  private  passenger  automobile  liability  insurance,  while 
they  have  a 96  percent  share  of  surety  insurance  (see  Webb  et  al. 
1984,  1:85-88).  Marvel (1982)  has shown  that there is a positive cor- 
relation across property-casualty  products between  the importance  of 
independent  agents  (as measured  by their market share) and the size 
of an agent's client  acquisition  costs (as measured  by advertising  and 
other  acquisition  expenses).  We  think  that  this  is some  support  in 
favor  of  our  conclusion  that  the  agent  will  own  the  list when  the 
agent's marginal incentives  are relatively important  in generating  the 
renewal.20 Table  1 is suggestive  of a similar point  for life insurance. 
19 The  property-casualty  number comes from Webb et al. (1984,  1:85); the life insur- 
ance  number  is from  Life  Insurance  Marketing  and  Research  Association  (LIMRA) 
(1977,  p. 9) and is the fraction of premiums  written by insurance brokers (as opposed  to 
captive  agents)  in  1977  for  the  United  States. The  LIMRA  study  also estimates  that 
brokers tend  to specialize  somewhat  in term  policies  rather than whole  life  policies. 
20  Marvel (1982) offers  an alternative explanation  for the correlation.  He argues that 
there  are situations  in which it is more  efficient  for the company  to advertise  than for 
the  agent.  In  these  situations,  the  insurance  company  helps  bring  the  client  to  the 
agent.  According  to Marvel, an agent  who did not have an exclusive  dealings  contract VERTICAL  AND  LATERAL  INTEGRATION  715 
TABLE  I 
LIFE  INSURANCE 
Importance  of 
Product  Agent  List Ownership* 
Substandard  insurance  55.9 
Term  insurance  46.2 
Group/pension  43.1 
Whole  life insurance  19.4 
SOURCE.-Czepiec  (1984),  table  1. 
NOTE.-An  agent who uses a brokerage  insurance  company  as the insur- 
ance provider for his client is an agent who is the owner of his client list. The 
percentage  figure  refers  to  agents  who  claim  to  "frequently"  place  their 
clients  with  a brokerage  insurance  company.  A brokerage  insurance  com- 
pany  is  an  insurance  company  that  uses  independent  "agents" who  are 
called brokers because they do not have a legal agency relationship  with the 
company  but instead  represent  the client. 
* Measured  as percentage  of agents  who use brokerage companies  to sell 
the indicated  product. 
The  selling  of  substandard  insurance  and  group/pension  insurance 
involves substantial effort  on the part of the agent  to find an insurer 
that is a good  match  for  the  client.  The  willingness  of  the  client  to 
with  the  insurance  company  could  then  switch  the  customer  to  another  insurance 
company  that does  not advertise and thus can pay higher  commissions.  This argument 
faces the  following  difficulty.  First, if the company  advertises the specific  benefits of its 
product,  why should  the customer  allow the agent  to switch him to another  insurance 
company?  Marvel seems  to be assuming  that the agent  uses a "bait and switch" sort of 
tactic against his customers.  Second,  if the insurance  company  convinces  the customer 
about  the general benefits  of  insurance,  then  how  does  an exclusive  dealings  contract 
protect  the insurance  company?  The  customer  will just  go to a cheaper  company  that 
advertises  somewhat  less (which he can find  in the Yellow  Pages rather than through 
television).  Another  piece  of evidence  that Marvel presents  in favor of his argument  is 
that exclusive  dealings  companies  tend  to  spend  more  on  advertising  than  do  com- 
panies  without  exclusive  dealings  contracts.  This  correlation  is  consistent  with  our 
explanation  as well.  If,  for  any  reason,  a company  is assured  of  more  policies  per 
customer  it acquires, then it may spend  more on acquisition costs. Further, Marvel does 
not explain  the fact that life insurance  tends to be sold through  captive agents far more 
frequently  than property-casualty  insurance.  He also does not distinguish  ownership  of 
the renewal  from  exclusive  dealings.  A company  can own the renewal without  having 
an exclusive  dealings  contract.  Industry  sources are emphatic  in pointing  out that "the 
most important characteristic of the independent  agency system in comparison  with the 
exclusive  agency  system  is the  independent  agent's 'ownership  of renewals  or expira- 
tions'"  (Strickler  1981,  p.  294).  The renewal plays no role in Marvel's argument. Never- 
theless,  Marvel's argument  can be  modified  to  supplement  ours  as follows.  First, an 
exclusive  dealings  contract is one method  of enforcing  list ownership  rights. Second,  if, 
unlike Marvel, we assume that the company  is advertising the specific high quality of its 
agent  force  (e.g.,  "your State Farm agent  is always available"), then  an exclusive  deal- 
ings contract would  be a method  of recovering  the expenditures  from its agents.  Note 
that an insurance  company  that is involved  in selling  for  a longer  time than any one 
agent or customer  has reputational  incentives  to choose  agents of high quality so that its 
advertising  is to some  extent  truthful.  We would  then  argue  that companies  will have 
exclusive  dealings  contracts  when  they  are  better  able  to  convince  customers  of  the 
agent's quality than  is the agent  or they  are able to select agents  of high  quality. 716  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
maintain his insurance  coverage  with the agent depends  on the qual- 
ity of the match. Hence  the ownership  of the list by the agent provides 
him with more protection  from the noncontractible  acts of the insur- 
ance  company  than  he  would  receive  with  company  list ownership 
and the back-loading  of  the commissions. 
V.  Conclusions 
When two parties enter into a relationship  in which assets will be used 
to generate  income,  the parties can, in principle, contractually specify 
exactly  who  will have  control  over  each  dimension  of  each  asset in 
each  particular  future  contingency.  We  have  argued  that  there  is 
often  a low-cost alternative  to contracts that allocate all specific rights 
of control.  In particular, when it is too costly for one party to specify a 
long  list of the particular rights it desires  over another  party's assets, 
then it may be optimal  for the first party to purchase all rights except 
those  specifically  mentioned  in  the  contract.  Ownership  is the  pur- 
chase  of  these  residual  rights  of  control.  Vertical  integration  is the 
purchase  of  the  assets of  a supplier  (or of  a purchaser)  for the  pur- 
pose  of  acquiring  the  residual  rights of control. 
The literature on transactions costs has emphasized  that incomplete 
contracts  can  cause  a  nonintegrated  relationship  to  yield  outcomes 
that are inferior  to those  that would  be achieved  with complete  con- 
tracts. It is implicitly assumed  that integration  yields the outcome  that 
would  arise  under  complete  contracts.  We  argue  that  the  relevant 
comparison  is not between  the nonintegrated  outcome  and the com- 
plete  contract  outcome  but instead  between  a contract that allocates 
residual  rights  to  one  party  and  a  contract  that  allocates  them  to 
another.  We have emphasized  the symmetry of control-namely,  that 
when  residual  rights  are  purchased  by one  party they  are  lost by a 
second  party-and  this inevitably creates distortions.  That is, integra- 
tion shifts the incentives  for opportunistic  and distortionary behavior, 
but it does  not remove  these  incentives. 
Our  model  emphasizes  the  distortions,  due  to contractual  incom- 
pleteness,  that can  prevent  a party from  getting  the  ex  post  return 
required to compensate  for his ex ante investment.  To the extent  that 
the  marginal  and  average  values  of  investment  move  together,  the 
allocation  of  ownership  rights,  by changing  the  average  investment 
return,  will affect  the level of investment.  We have seen that, if firm i 
owns  firm j, firm i will use  its residual  rights  of  control  to obtain  a 
large share of the ex post surplus,  and this will cause firm i to overin- 
vest and  firm j  to underinvest.  Under  nonintegration,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  ex  post  surplus  will be  divided  more  evenly,  and  so each 
firm will invest to a moderate  extent.  Integration  is therefore  optimal VERTICAL  AND  LATERAL  INTEGRATION  717 
when one  firm's investment  decision  is particularly important  relative 
to  the  other  firm's, whereas  nonintegration  is desirable  when  both 
investment  decisions  are "somewhat" important. 
It should  be  noted,  however,  that contractual  incompleteness  can 
lead to other  distortions.  For instance,  even  if all ex ante investments 
can be verified and hence  are reimbursable,  residual rights may mat- 
ter  if  the  ex  post  distribution  of  the  surplus  is important  for  other 
reasons,  for example,  because  of the  risk aversion  of the parties. An 
example  is where  manager  1 has an investment  project but does  not 
wish to finance it entirely himself  since he would then bear all the risk. 
One possibility is to raise the funds  externally  from the market, which 
is risk neutral,  say. The  outside  investors,  who we suppose  are led by 
manager 2, should  then receive as their return a sizable fraction of the 
project's benefits.  If  manager  1 retains  control  of  the  project,  how- 
ever, he may be able to divert these benefits ex post from the investors 
to himself  through  his choice  of  noncontractibles,  and knowing  this, 
the investors  may withhold  some  of their funds.  In order  to encour- 
age outside  investment,  therefore,  manager  1 may have to hand over 
some  control  to  manager  2,  for  example,  by giving  him  ownership 
rights over  some  of  the assets.21 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  if  there  is some  barrier  to  ex  post 
renegotiation,  caused,  for  example,  by  the  presence  of  transaction 
costs  or  asymmetric  information,  control  of  residual  rights  will  be 
important  in  affecting  the  size of  the  ex  post  surplus  as well  as its 
distribution  (even in the absence of ex ante investments).  An analysis of 
the  costs  and  benefits  of  ownership  in  this  case  may  be  found  in 
Grossman  and  Hart  (1984).  A  related  idea  is  discussed  by  Farrell 
(1985). 
Though  we have emphasized  residual  rights of control  over assets 
in order to explain  who owns which assets, we can also use our theory 
to  explain  residual  rights  over  actions.  In  particular,  an  employer- 
employee  relationship  differs  from  a contractor-contractee  relation- 
ship  in  the  allocation  of  residual  rights  of  control  over  actions.  An 
employer-employee  relationship  is typically characterized  by the fact 
that many details of the job to be carried out are left to the employer's 
discretion;  that  is, the  employer  has  many  of  the  residual  rights  of 
control.  In a contractor-contractee  relationship,  the job is specified  in 
much  greater  detail,  and  the  contractee  typically  has  many  of  the 
residual  rights of control  over  nonspecified  actions.  It may be useful 
in future work to apply our model  to an analysis of the relative advan- 
tages of contractor-contractee  and employer-employee  relationships. 
21  We would like to thank John  Minahan for a helpful  discussion  about this example. 718  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
It is worthwhile  to consider  which of the assumptions  of the "Coase 
theorem" we drop  in order  to reach the conclusion  that the distribu- 
tion  of  ownership  rights  has efficiency  consequences.  The  model  of 
Sections  II and  III  permits  ex post bargaining  of the type suggested 
in Coase (1-960), but the ex ante efficiency of the relationship  between 
the  two  parties  will  depend  on  how  residual  rights  of  control  are 
allocated.  The  impossibility  of  ex  ante bargaining  over all aspects of 
the  product  to be  delivered,  that is, the  incompleteness  of  the  con- 
tract, is the source of our conclusion  that the distribution  of property 
rights has efficiency  consequences. 
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